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(1) 
ENSURING THE CONTINUITY OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT: THE PRESIDENCY 
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2003, 
U.S. SENATE, 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, 
Washington, DC. 
The Committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 
SR–325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Trent Lott and Hon. 
John Cornyn, presiding. 
Present: Senators Lott, Cornyn, DeWine, Dodd, and Feingold. 
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT, A U.S. SENATOR 
FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 
Chairman LOTT. The hearing will come to order. 
Thank you all for being here this morning. I know that there are 
a number of people that are interested in this issue that have re-
sponsibilities on the floor of the Senate right now. Senator Feingold 
did leave to go down to do a statement and will be returning short-
ly, and we expect other Senators will be joining us as we go for-
ward this morning. 
This is a joint hearing, and I am really pleased to be able to co- 
chair this with the Senator from Texas, Senator Cornyn, who is 
Chairman of the Subcommittee with jurisdiction in this area, and 
who has really been focusing on continuity of Government and suc-
cession issues, and has brought a vigor and an interest in this that 
really has been very helpful. 
As I have gotten into this subject myself, I have become more 
and more interested and more and more concerned about where we 
are today in terms of Presidential succession. And so I think it is 
appropriate we have these hearings. I want to thank our witnesses 
for being here today. I will give you an appropriate introduction in 
a few minutes, and we will look forward to hearing from you. 
I want to begin with an interesting historical anecdote about the 
Senate Rules and Administration Committee and the issue of Pres-
idential succession. After a major Senate reorganization in 1946, 
the Senate Rules Committee was merged with the Senate Privi-
leges and Elections Committee, and the Senate Rules and Adminis-
tration Committee was officially created in January 1947. 
The first public hearings held by the newly created Committee 
were on the subject of Presidential succession and how the system 
should be remodeled to deal with the advent of the atomic bomb, 
interestingly enough, the death of President Franklin Roosevelt, 
and other issues that were related to this subject. 
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Since those 1947 hearings, no substantive legislation has been 
passed to deal with the gaps in the current Presidential succession 
system. So I think it is way past time for us to have these hear-
ings, consider these matters, and hopefully even find a way to act. 
There are many areas where there is a gap in our planning for un-
expected disasters, and this is obviously right at the top of that list. 
I have long been interested in this subject. Earlier this year, the 
Rules and Administration Committee considered and reported out 
S. 148, a bill by Senator DeWine and others, which added the De-
partment of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge to the line of 
Presidential succession. As you can see from the chart—do we have 
our chart up here?—Table 1, Secretary Ridge would be eighth in 
line of succession after the Attorney General. This bill has already 
passed the full Senate and is awaiting action in the House. 
Given the circumstances of the world today, it is vitally impor-
tant that we have a system of Presidential succession that operates 
efficiently and effectively with minimal interruption. Since Sep-
tember 11, 2001, Congress has been studying all aspects of our 
Government’s operations to ensure that we continue to function in 
the event of a catastrophe. 
The current statutes governing the Presidential succession sys-
tem, as we have already noted, have not been dealt with since 
1947. President Harry Truman was very insistent on this area 
being considered, but as a result of what happened with Harry 
Truman becoming President, the Vice Presidency remained vacant 
from 1945 to 1949. After several years of work from President Tru-
man, Congress finally amended the Presidential succession stat-
utes. As a result, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 was 
adopted, and it is still in force today. 
Amazingly, the United States has been without a sitting Vice 
President on 18 separate occasions. As recently as 1963, when Lyn-
don Johnson ascended to the Presidency as a result of the assas-
sination of President Kennedy, we did not have a Vice President 
from 1963 to 1965. And during Johnson’s Presidency, many people 
worried about the situation. If a tragedy should befall President 
Johnson, what would happen? And we might have been faced with 
a difficult situation replacing the President as there was no Vice 
President and the sitting speaker, John McCormack, born in 1891, 
and President pro tem Carl Hayden, born in 1877, were certainly 
well advanced in years. 
In 1965, as a result of Johnson’s ascension to the Presidency with 
no Vice President waiting in the wings, the 89th Congress proposed 
the 25th Amendment to the Constitution. This amendment is a 
critical piece of the succession puzzle as we know it today, and we 
have used it twice already, when Jerry Ford was selected as Vice 
President and ultimately he became President, and then with the 
selection of Nelson Rockefeller. I was on the House Judiciary Com-
mittee at the time, Senator Cornyn, and was the first one to have 
an opportunity—on the Committee that had the first opportunity 
to deal with the confirmation process of a Vice President under the 
25th Amendment. 
While the issue of Presidential succession has just recently re-
gained the national spotlight, this issue has been debated and dis-
cussed over the years. In fact, during those very first hearings in 
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1947, the Chairman of the Rules and Administration Committee, 
Senator Wayland Brooks of Illinois, proposed forming a joint com-
mittee to deal specifically with the issue of Presidential succession. 
And there have been a plethora of succession issues that have been 
proposed over the years but no actions taken. 
When I have looked at the hearings on that, there are some very 
interesting quotes from the Senators that were involved in that, 
and they apply to today. Of course, in those days, they were wor-
ried just about the atom bomb. Well, you know, that is still a factor 
we have to consider, a dirty bomb or a nuclear bomb or some other 
travesty that could occur, and we could have a real mess on our 
hands. 
Another problem with it, of course, is the bumping procedure 
that might be employed whereby, you know, the Speaker might be-
come President for a while, but then once a Vice President would 
be selected, I guess the Speaker would be bumped back to the posi-
tion he had previously held. There would be a problem with how 
an interim Speaker would be selected. A real musical chairs could 
occur. 
I think the area that really is the most interesting is the fact 
that even though it was not always the case, we have Members of 
Congress in the line of succession. I understand from the readings 
that I have been doing that that issue was never really settled by 
our Founding Fathers and probably would pretty heatedly debated. 
But if you look back just in recent history where if something had 
happened to President Clinton and Vice President Gore, Newt 
Gingrich could have at one point become President. Then there 
would be a problem with selecting a new Speaker and what would 
you do with the Cabinet. It has been described as that sort of thing 
could cause not a succession but a revolution in a way. And we 
have got another chart up there that points out how many times— 
you know, what would have happened if this had occurred, both 
with Democrat and Republican administrations. 
For the past 50 years, there have been many, many years where 
you had Congress controlled by one party and the Presidency the 
other. So this is an area that we need to think about. 
I do not want to tell Senator Stevens this yet, but I really have 
come to the conclusion that congressional leaders should be taken 
out of the line of succession. We will have to make it prospective 
so that Denny Hastert and Ted Stevens will be happy with that. 
But I think it is a real problem, and I have for years. 
[The prepared statement of Senator Lott appears as a submission 
for the record.] 
So I am glad we are having this hearing. Again, I want to thank 
our panel of witnesses. But before I introduce them, let me call on 
Senator Cornyn, who has really been doing good work in this and 
other related issues, for his opening statement. 
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
THE STATE OF TEXAS 
Senator CORNYN. Well, thank you, Senator Lott, for those thor-
ough introductory remarks, and thank you for your leadership on 
this important hearing. 
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As you recounted, the Senate Rules Committee has jurisdiction 
over the Presidential succession statute, and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee has jurisdiction over constitutional issues through the 
Subcommittee that I chair, the Senate Subcommittee on the Con-
stitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights. So today’s joint hear-
ing of the two Committees on the topic of Presidential succession 
is quite appropriate—and after 9/11, some 2 years later, quite im-
portant. 
I want to thank Senator Hatch, the Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, who, shortly after I spoke on this subject on the Senate 
floor, invited me to chair the hearings for the full Judiciary Com-
mittee, which, of course, I gratefully accepted. And I want to thank 
him again today for his leadership and for giving these issues the 
serious consideration that they deserve. 
Last Tuesday, I chaired the first in a series of hearings on con-
tinuity issues to examine serious weaknesses in our ability to en-
sure the continuity of Congress. Fortunately, with respect to to-
day’s hearing, the Constitution gives us ample authority to ensure 
the continuity of the Presidency, even as it may be inadequate with 
respect to Congress itself. Unfortunately, however, the current 
Presidential succession law, enacted, as you heard from Senator 
Lott, in 1947, has long troubled the Nation’s top legal scholars, 
some of whom we have here today, across the political spectrum as 
both unconstitutional and unworkable. 
This is an intolerable situation. We must have a system in place 
so that it is always clear and always beyond doubt who the Presi-
dent is, especially in times of national crisis. 
Yet our current succession law fails badly under that standard. 
Imagine the following scenarios. 
The President and Vice President are both killed. Under the cur-
rent law, next in line to act as President is the Speaker of the 
House. Suppose, however, that the Speaker is a member of the 
party opposite of the now deceased President and that the Sec-
retary of State, acting out of party loyalty, asserts a competing 
claim to the Presidency. The Secretary argues that Members of 
Congress are legislators and, thus, are not officers who are con-
stitutionally eligible to serve as President. Believe it or not, the 
Secretary actually has a rather strong case, in my view. In fact, he 
can cite for support the views of James Madison, the father of our 
Constitution, who argued this precise point in 1792. 
Who is the President? Whose orders should be followed by our 
armed forces, by our intelligence agencies, and by domestic law en-
forcement bureaus? If lawsuits are filed, will courts accept jurisdic-
tion? How long will they take to rule? How will they rule? And how 
will their rulings be respected? 
Or imagine, once again, the President and Vice President are 
killed, and the Speaker is a member of the opposite party. This 
time, however, the Speaker declines the opportunity to act as Presi-
dent in a public-minded effort to prevent a change in party control 
of the White House as a result of a terrorist attack. The Secretary 
of State thus becomes the Acting President. In subsequent weeks, 
however, the Secretary takes a series of actions that upset the 
Speaker. The Speaker responds by asserting his right under the 
statute to take over as Acting President. 
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The Secretary counters that he cannot constitutionally be re-
moved from the White House by anyone other than the President 
or Vice President because under the Constitution he is entitled to 
act as President until the disability of the President or Vice Presi-
dent is removed or a President shall be elected. Confusion and liti-
gation ensue. Again, who is President? 
Or imagine that the President, Vice President, and Speaker are 
all killed, along with numerous Members of Congress, for example, 
as a result of an attack during the State of the Union address. The 
remaining Members of the House, a small fraction of the entire 
membership representing just a narrow geographic region of the 
country and a narrow portion of the ideological spectrum, claim 
that they can constitute a quorum and then attempt to elect a new 
Speaker. That new Speaker then argues that he is Acting Presi-
dent. The Senate President pro tem and the Secretary of State each 
assert competing claims of their own that they are President. 
Again, who is President? 
Or, finally, notice that the President, Vice President, Speaker, 
Senate President pro tem, and the Members of the Cabinet all live 
and work in the greater Washington, D.C., area. Now imagine how 
easy it would be for a catastrophic terrorist attack in Washington 
to kill or incapacitate the entire line of succession to the Presidency 
as well as the President himself. Then who would be President? 
In each of these scenarios, we do not know for sure who the 
President is. A chilling thought for all Americans. In an age of ter-
rorism and a time of war, this is no longer mere fodder for Tom 
Clancy novels or episodes of ‘‘West Wing.’’ 
These nightmare scenarios are serious concerns after 9/11. On 
that terrible day, Federal officers ordered dramatic evacuations of 
the White House, even shouting at White House staffers, ‘‘Run.’’ On 
that day, the Secret Service executed its emergency plan to protect 
and defend the line of Presidential succession for the first time ever 
in American history, according to some reports. In subsequent 
months, the President and Vice President were constantly kept 
separate for months and months after 9/11, precisely out of the fear 
that the continuity of the Presidency might otherwise be in serious 
jeopardy. 
I believe we must fix the Presidential succession law, and fix it 
now, so that these nightmare scenarios will never come true and 
will never again be able to haunt the American people or our form 
of Government. 
I look forward to the testimony, Mr. Chairman, of these excep-
tional witnesses and to learn what suggestions they might have for 
reforming the Presidential succession law. After all, we have had 
2 years since 9/11 to do this. Two years is too long, and the time 
to plan for the unthinkable is now. 
Thank you, Senator Lott. 
[The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn appears as a submis-
sion for the record.] 
Chairman LOTT. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 
Senator DeWine, we already gave you credit for your interest in 
these succession issues, and I have noted that your legislation, S. 
148, passed the Senate June 26th and is now pending before the 
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House. We would be glad to hear any opening statement you would 
like to make at this time. 
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DEWINE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
THE STATE OF OHIO 
Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, I will be very, very brief. I just 
want to congratulate you and Senator Cornyn for holding this hear-
ing. 
As you both have said, there are almost unimaginable scenarios 
that are not unimaginable, that certainly could happen, that com-
pel us to take action and to address these concerns. And 2 years 
is too long. It is time for this Congress to take action. It is time 
for this Congress to address the concerns that we have. 
And so I am very, very happy that we are holding this hearing 
today. It is about time. 
Thank you. 
Chairman LOTT. Thank you, Senator DeWine. 
Our first witness is Professor Akhil Amar. Mr. Amar has served 
as a distinguished law professor at Yale University for two decades 
and has been extensively published on the issues of Presidential 
succession and the U.S. Constitution. He is considered one of the 
foremost authorities on the subject of Presidential succession and 
the Constitution. 
Dr. John Fortier—is that the correct pronunciation?—is an ac-
complished scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and serves 
as Executive Director for the Continuity of Government Commis-
sion. He has written and studied on these issues of governmental 
continuity as well as Presidential succession. 
And Mr. Miller Baker is a partner in the law firm of McDermott 
Will & Emery. He previously served as counsel to the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee as well as at the Justice Department. He is also 
a former intelligence officer for the U.S. military and has been re-
cently published on Presidential succession issues by the Federalist 
Society. 
Our final witness is Professor Howard Wasserman. Professor 
Wasserman teaches law at Florida International University College 
of Law and has studied and published on the subject of Presi-
dential succession and the U.S. Constitution. 
We look forward to hearing from all of you, and if you would give 
us your testimony in that order, and after you have testified, we 
will have perhaps other Senators here that would like to make 
statements, and then we have got a series of very interesting ques-
tions we would like to propound to you. 
Professor? 
STATEMENT OF AKHIL AMAR, SOUTHMAYD PROFESSOR OF 
LAW AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, YALE LAW SCHOOL, NEW 
HAVEN, CONNECTICUT 
Mr. AMAR. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My name is Akhil Reed Amar. 
I am the Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale 
and have been writing about the topic of Presidential succession for 
over a decade. In February 1994, I offered testimony on this topic 
to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, and I 
am grateful for the opportunity to appear here today. As my testi-
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mony draws upon several articles that I have written on the sub-
ject, I would respectfully request that these articles be made part 
of the record. 
The current Presidential succession Act, 3 U.S.C. section 19, is 
in my view a disastrous statute, an accident waiting to happen. It 
should be repealed and replaced. I will summarize its main prob-
lems and then outline my proposed alternative. 
First, section 19 violates the Constitution’s Succession Clause, 
Article II, section 1, paragraph 6, which authorizes Congress to 
name an ‘‘officer’’ to act as President in the event that both Presi-
dent and Vice President are unavailable. House and Senate leaders 
are not ‘‘officers’’ within the meaning of the Succession Clause. 
Rather, the Framers clearly contemplated that a Cabinet officer 
would be named as Acting President. This is not merely my per-
sonal reading of Article II. It is also James Madison’s view, which 
he expressed forcefully while a Congressman in 1792. 
Second, the act’s bumping provision, section 19(d)(2), constitutes 
an independent violation of the succession clause, which says that 
the ‘‘officer’’ named by Congress shall ‘‘act as President...until the 
[Presidential or Vice Presidential] Disability be removed, or a 
President shall be elected.’’ section 19(d)(2) instead says, in effect, 
that the successor officer shall act as President until someone else 
wants the job. Bumping weakens the Presidency itself and in-
creases instability and uncertainty at the very moment when the 
Nation is most in need of tranquility. And I think that the scenario 
that Senator Cornyn offered very vividly captured some of the 
problems with instability and how it weakens the Presidency in a 
variety of situations. 
Now, even if I were wrong about these constitutional claims, they 
are nevertheless substantial ones. The first point, to repeat, comes 
directly from James Madison, father of the Constitution, who 
helped draft the specific words of the Succession Clause. Over the 
last decade, many citizens and scholars from across the ideological 
spectrum have told me that they agree with Madison about the 
constitutional questions involved. If, God forbid, America were ever 
to lose both her President and Vice President, even temporarily, 
the succession law in place should provide unquestioned legitimacy 
to the ‘‘officer’’ who must then act as President—in part to keep it 
out of the courts and to reassure the country. And, again, I think 
the scenarios that Senator Cornyn offered were very vivid and, to 
me, quite powerful. With so large a constitutional cloud hanging 
over it, section 19 fails to provide this desired level of legitimacy. 
In addition to these constitutional objections, there are many pol-
icy problems with section 19. First, section 19’s requirement that 
an Acting President resign his previous post makes this law an 
awkward instrument in situations of temporary disability. And, 
Senator Lott, I think that is partly what you were talking about 
with having to leave your House job and the instabilities that that 
would create. The House needs to get new leadership and all of 
that. section 19’s rules also run counter to the approach of the 25th 
Amendment, Senator Lott, which you mentioned, which facilitates 
smooth handoffs of power back and forth in situations of short-term 
disability—scheduled surgery, for example. 
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Second, section 19 creates a variety of perverse incentives and 
conflicts of interest, warping the Congress’s proper role in impeach-
ments and in confirmations of Vice Presidential nominees under 
the 25th Amendment. 
Third, section 19 can upend the results of a Presidential election. 
If Americans elect party A to the White House, why should we end 
up with party B? Here, too, section 19 is in serious tension with 
the better approach embodied in the 25th Amendment, which en-
ables a President to pick his successor and thereby promotes execu-
tive party continuity. 
Fourth, section 19 provides no mechanism for addressing argu-
able Vice Presidential disabilities or for determining Presidential 
disability in the event the Vice President is dead or disabled. These 
are especially troubling omissions because of the indispensable role 
that the Vice President needs to play under the 25th Amendment. 
Fifth, section 19 fails to deal with certain windows of special vul-
nerability immediately before and after Presidential elections. 
In short, section 19 violates Article II and is out of sync with the 
basic spirit and structure of the 25th Amendment, which became 
part of our Constitution two decades after section 19 was enacted. 
The main argument against Cabinet succession is that Presi-
dential powers should go to an elected leader, not an appointed un-
derling. But the 25th Amendment offers an attractive alternative 
model of handpicked succession: from Richard Nixon to Gerald 
Ford to Nelson Rockefeller, for example, with a President naming 
the person who will fill in for him and complete his term if he is 
unable to do so himself. The 25th Amendment does not give a 
President carte blanche; it provides for a special confirmation proc-
ess to vet the President’s nominee, and confirmation in that special 
process confers added legitimacy upon the nominee. And, Senator 
Lott, it was very interesting to hear that even as a House Member, 
you were involved in the confirmation process, which ordinarily 
does not happen, but the 25th Amendment creates that special 
level of participation and legitimacy. 
So if the 25th Amendment reflects the best approach to sequen-
tial double vacancy—when the top two positions, President and 
Vice President, become unavailable at slightly different times, first 
one, then the other—a closely analogous approach should be used 
in the event of simultaneous vacancy when they both become un-
available at the same instant. Congress could, if it wanted to, cre-
ate a new Cabinet post—it could be called Assistant Vice President 
or Second Vice President or First Secretary; the name is not par-
ticularly important. But this new position would be one that would 
be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate in a 
high-visibility process. This officer’s sole responsibilities would be 
to receive regular briefings preparing him or her to serve at a mo-
ment’s notice, and to lie low until needed: in the line of succession 
but out of the line of fire, perhaps out of this city altogether in a 
location that would be very far removed from the President and 
Vice President in general. 
The democratic mandate of this Assistant Vice President or First 
Secretary might be further enhanced if Presidential candidates an-
nounced their prospective nominees for this third-in-line job well 
before the November election. In casting ballots for their preferred 
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Presidential candidate, American voters would also be endorsing 
that candidate’s announced succession team of Vice President and 
third in line. Cabinet officers should follow the Assistant Vice 
President in the longer line of succession, as is true in the current 
statute. 
This solution solves the constitutional problems I identified. The 
new Assistant Vice President would clearly be an ‘‘officer’’; bump-
ing would be eliminated. The solution also solves the practical 
problems. No resignations would be required; power could flow 
smoothly back and forth in situations of temporary disability. Con-
gressional conflicts of interest would be avoided. Party and policy 
continuity within the executive branch would be preserved. And 
the process by which the American electorate and then the Senate 
endorsed any individual Assistant Vice President would confer the 
desired democratic legitimacy on this officer, bolstering his or her 
mandate to lead in a crisis. 
The two additional issues I have raised today—Vice Presidential 
disability and windows of special vulnerability at election time— 
also have clean solutions, as explained in my 1994 testimony. 
Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Amar appears as a submission 
for the record.] 
Chairman LOTT. Thank you. 
Mr. Fortier? 
STATEMENT OF JOHN C. FORTIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, AND RE-
SEARCH ASSOCIATE, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
Mr. FORTIER. I would like to thank the Rules and Judiciary Com-
mittees for holding this hearing on the important subject of Presi-
dential succession. 
Let me salute the Senate for already having begun this task. 
Senator Lott mentioned this morning S. 148, Senator DeWine’s bill, 
which passed through the Rules Committee and the full Senate. I 
support the substance of the bill, putting the Secretary of Home-
land Security in the line of succession, but also applaud the think-
ing behind it. Typically, when a new Cabinet position, we just lump 
them at the end of the line of succession without thinking about 
their relative importance. In this case, we did think about it, and 
we moved the Cabinet Secretary up to a place below the big four 
Cabinet members, but thinking about his relative importance with 
national security matters. 
If you use this as a model to think through and not follow simply 
the status quo of the current Presidential succession Act, I think 
we will be moving in the right direction. 
In my written testimony, I provide a number of areas that need 
improvement, but let me highlight three this morning. 
First, everyone in the line of succession lives and works in the 
Washington, D.C., area. In the nightmare scenario of terrorists det-
onating a nuclear device, it is possible that everyone in the line of 
succession might be killed. Imagine the aftermath: a parade of gen-
erals, Governors, and Under Secretaries claiming to be in charge. 
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To fix this problem, I have a solution which is similar in some 
ways to the one that Professor Amar presented, but I suggest that 
we create four or five offices that would be lower down the line of 
succession that would be held by people outside of Washington. In 
particular, we can imagine that a President would nominate sitting 
Governors, if the State Constitution of that State did not forbid 
them to hold Federal office, which some States do and some States 
don’t; or former public figures at a high level—former Presidents, 
former Vice Presidents, Cabinet members, or Members of Congress. 
These offices could be, through a regular nomination and confirma-
tion process, put in place. We would ask them to generally stay 
outside of Washington, receive regular security briefings, and the 
office could be structured with some additional duties, such as re-
gional coordination of homeland security issues. My proposal is to 
put them in the middle of the Cabinet, somewhere below the top 
five officers. They would serve as an ultimate backstop if the worst 
were to happen. 
Second, consider the role of congressional leaders in the line of 
succession. I think it is fair to say that the dominant view of con-
stitutional scholars is that it is unconstitutional to have Members 
of Congress in the line of succession, although, of course, practice 
has gone in the other direction for many years. 
I share this view that at least the Framers did not intend to put 
Members in the line of succession, but in my testimony, I try to 
walk through the various scenarios that Congress might be called 
on to succeed to the Presidency congressional leaders and identify 
which of them makes sense for us and which of them don’t. And 
if you come to the same conclusions that I do, you will find at least 
a way of reducing the role of Congress in the line of succession. 
For example, Congress could potentially—or a Member of Con-
gress could come to the Presidency based on the death, the inca-
pacity, the resignation, the removal, or the failure to qualify of the 
President. And to take the incapacity issue, for example, do we 
want a Speaker of the House taking over temporarily for a Presi-
dent? It could be a Speaker of the House of the other party. It 
would be a case where the Speaker would have to resign his or her 
seat in Congress and as Speaker. If you have a scenario of a Presi-
dent who is fading in and out of capacity, has a condition that 
comes back into health, then displaces the Speaker of the House, 
potentially another Speaker of the House, newly elected, would 
then have to take over. It makes little sense for an incapacitation 
scenario to involve Congress. And several of the other scenarios I 
also find problematic. 
The one case where I would recommend keeping Congress in the 
line—and I think this is consistent with the Constitution because 
it comes from a different provision in the 20th Amendment—is that 
of the failure to qualify of a President. In the case where an elec-
tion controversy goes all the way up to January 20th and we have 
no President, or in the case of an attack that occurs shortly before 
the inauguration, there is no Cabinet from the incoming adminis-
tration, and the only other option we would have would be to go 
back to the Cabinet of the prior administration. 
Third, think of individual scenarios, and in particular, the inau-
guration scenario, which I referred to. This is perhaps the most 
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vulnerable time for Government when all of the people at the top 
of the line of succession gather together for a ceremony, and yet 
none of the people in the line of succession, the Cabinet members 
for the new administration, have been nominated. Consider for a 
moment what would happen if terrorists had set off a bomb during 
the inaugural ceremony. The President-elect, the Vice President- 
elect, Speaker, and pro tem are likely there and would have per-
ished along with many Members of Congress and the Supreme 
Court. Who would succeed to the Presidency? Well, the Cabinet, 
but the Cabinet of the prior administration. Imagine such an at-
tack had occurred in 2001. A country expecting Republican George 
W. Bush to take office would have found themselves with a Demo-
cratic President Larry Summers. As Secretary of the Treasury, 
Summers was the highest ranking Clinton Cabinet member eligible 
to serve as President. 
But the scenario is actually even more complicated than that, as 
many Cabinet Secretaries typically resign before the inauguration, 
leaving Acting Secretaries in their place. And an Acting Secretary 
is in the line of succession as long as that person has been con-
firmed by the Senate for some position. So if it is a political ap-
pointee, a number 2 or a number 3 person at the State Depart-
ment, that person will take over as Acting Secretary of State and 
be in the line as well. 
I have a piece coming out entitled ‘‘President Michael Armacost?’’ 
who, if you know, the president of Brookings could have been the 
President of the United States in the scenario of the 1989 inau-
gural. 
One of the difficulties here is that there is a gap between when 
the President can take office and can nominate his Cabinet and the 
Senate can come in to confirm them. At times, in cases of quick ac-
tion, there is a gap of only 3 or 4 hours. But it has been up to 5 
days in the case of 1989. And there are several changes in custom 
and law that would protect us from this scenario. 
First would be to establish a custom of the outgoing President to 
nominate the new Cabinet coming in on the morning of January 
20th. The Senate could come in, confirm the Cabinet before noon 
of January 20th, and you would have people in place in case the 
worst happened, and those people would not have to attend the in-
augural scenario. 
Second, the question of whether an Acting Secretary should be 
in the line of succession. I recommend that we take out that provi-
sion and just rely on those who were confirmed for the Cabinet post 
themselves. 
And, finally, there are significant problems with the continuity of 
Congress itself in the case of an inaugural attack. Congress may 
have its own difficulties reconstituting itself and to the extent that 
we can address them, we come up with a more reasonable congres-
sional leader coming out of a newly re-established Congress that 
might eventually take over. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fortier appears as a submission 
for the record.] 
Chairman LOTT. Thank you. 
Mr. Baker? 
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STATEMENT OF M. MILLER BAKER, ESQ., MCDERMOTT WILL & 
EMERY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 
Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, and Members of 
the Committees, thank you for the invitation to be here today to 
discuss issues pertaining to Presidential succession. 
This issue, which has surfaced as a political and constitutional 
issue every several decades in American history, as Senator Lott 
noted, is of particular concern in the aftermath of September the 
11th. It is very clear, for all the horror of that terrible day, it easily 
could have been even worse. It is apparent that had our enemies 
planned and executed a strike like September 11th for the prin-
cipal purpose of decapitating the Government of the United 
States—and, in particular, the Presidency—that they very well 
might have succeeded. 
Chairman LOTT. Mr. Baker, pull that microphone just a little bit 
closer, if you would, please. 
Mr. BAKER. Certainly. 
Chairman LOTT. Thank you. 
Mr. BAKER. Any attempt by America’s enemies to decapitate the 
U.S. Government unfortunately would be assisted, rather than 
thwarted, by the Presidential Succession Act of 1947. In my view, 
the 1947 Act is the single most poorly designed statute in the en-
tire United States Code. I say this because the 1947 Act could de-
prive the Nation at the worst possible moment of what Alexander 
Hamilton in the Federalist No. 70 called ‘‘energy in the executive,’’ 
with truly catastrophic consequences. 
My written statement describes in detail my criticisms of the 
1947 Act. I will briefly summarize my views here. 
First, the 1947 Act gives the House Speaker and the President 
pro tem a special preference in the line of succession that enables 
them to bump or to displace a Cabinet officer serving as Acting 
President, even if the House Speaker doing the bumping was cho-
sen only by a handful of Representatives in the aftermath of an at-
tack that left most Members of the House dead. 
Even if the Speaker and the President pro tem are to remain in 
the line of succession—and I do not believe that they should—this 
special privilege of bumping by a new Speaker or a President pro 
tem by one that chose not to assume the Acting Presidency when 
it became available should be eliminated from the law. 
Second, the 1947 Act requires that a statutory successor resign 
his or her post as a condition of assuming the Acting Presidency 
even if the period of serving in this capacity is only for a few hours. 
This requirement could easily induce hesitation, especially if the 
fate of the President and the Vice President was unknown. This in-
ducement to hesitation should be removed from the law. The law 
should induce action, not inaction. We need energy in the execu-
tive. 
Third, the 1947 Act does not allow a more senior Cabinet suc-
cessor that was temporarily unable to act to assume the Acting 
Presidency from a more junior Cabinet officer that assumed the 
Acting Presidency. This induces hesitation because a lower-ranking 
Cabinet officer may be fearful of being charged with usurpation. 
For example, on September the 11th, when Colin Powell was out 
of the country, if the President, Vice President, Speaker, and Presi-
VerDate Aug 31 2005 14:03 Dec 23, 2008 Jkt 045948 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\45948.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
13 
dent pro tem had been killed or were missing in attacks on the 
White House and the Capitol building, then-Treasury Secretary 
Paul O’Neill would have had to have made an immediate decision 
about whether Colin Powell was unable to discharge Presidential 
duties because of his absence from the country. The military may 
have been on the phone requesting authority to shoot down air-
liners. In the meantime, the Treasury Secretary is trying to decide 
whether or not he has authority to become Acting President. In the 
meantime, the decision has to be made. 
Under section 19, had O’Neill assumed Presidential duties, Pow-
ell would not have been able to displace O’Neill upon his return to 
Washington, which might have resulted in claims that O’Neill had 
wrongfully usurped the Presidency and in litigation over whether 
Powell, in fact, had been unable to discharge Presidential duties at 
the time of O’Neill’s assumption of the Acting Presidency. The very 
fact that O’Neill might be exposed to charges of usurpation might 
cause him to hesitate before acting. A Cabinet officer in O’Neill’s 
position on September the 11th would probably remember the ridi-
cule that Alexander Haig suffered in 1981 from declaring that he 
was in charge pending the Vice President’s return to Washington 
and doubtless would like to avoid a similar fate. 
Fourth, I recommend that the Congress remove the Speaker, the 
President pro tem, and all the Cabinet officers from the line of suc-
cession save the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Secretary 
of Homeland Security. As has been noted before, placing the con-
gressional leaders in the line of succession allows for the possibility 
of undoing the results of the last Presidential election. In addition, 
does anyone seriously believe, with all due respect to the incum-
bents of these offices, that the Secretary of Agriculture or the Sec-
retary of Veterans Affairs should be catapulted into the Presidency, 
especially in the heat of a supreme crisis that could compare to De-
cember 7, 1941, and November 22, 1963, rolled into one? 
Fifth, Congress should create special successor officers comprised 
of State Governors and others that the President would appoint by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate or, as Professor 
Amar has suggested, possibly with the House involved as well. 
Sixth, I believe Congress should submit a constitutional amend-
ment to the States for ratification to cure the various deficiencies 
in the Presidential succession mechanism that cannot be corrected 
by statute and to validate other provisions in the succession law 
that may be unconstitutional. 
Since it is clear that a constitutional amendment is necessary to 
ensure the continuity of Congress, the same amendment should 
also address issues of Presidential succession. By way of example 
of an issue that probably needs to be addressed by this amend-
ment, it is unclear under existing law whether when the Acting 
President should nominate a Vice President under the 25th 
Amendment, when the new Vice President is confirmed by Con-
gress, does the new Vice President then bump the Acting President 
who made the nomination of the Vice President under the 25th 
Amendment? That needs to be clarified by existing law, and that 
can probably only be clarified by a constitutional amendment. 
Thank you very much. 
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears as a submission 
for the record.] 
Chairman LOTT. Thank you. 
Mr. Wasserman? 
STATEMENT OF HOWARD M. WASSERMAN, ASSISTANT PRO-
FESSOR OF LAW, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
COLLEGE OF LAW, MIAMI, FLORIDA 
Mr. WASSERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, 
members of the Committee, my name is Howard Wasserman. I am 
Assistant Professor of Law at Florida International University Col-
lege of Law. 
My testimony this morning draws on a couple of articles that I 
have written on this subject. I ask unanimous consent that they be 
included in the record. 
Chairman LOTT. Without objection, they will be included in the 
record at this point. 
Mr. WASSERMAN. The consensus from the members of the Com-
mittee and the panelists that we have heard so far this morning 
seems to agree on two points: section 19 has serious, multiple flaws 
and has been flawed from the beginning, and that the events of 
September 11, 2001, drew those flaws into very specific relief. And 
I want to focus on a couple of areas from my submitted testimony 
as to those flaws. 
First, I agree that Cabinet officers are and should be the primary 
and preferred statutory successors as a matter of partisan con-
tinuity, as a matter of democratic legitimacy, and as a matter of 
separation of powers. I also agree that we need to extend the line 
of succession by expanding the Cabinet, particularly by creating a 
single position—Assistant Vice President, First Secretary, Suc-
cessor Secretary—whose sole job would be to sit as first in line of 
succession and to remain outside of Washington. 
I believe, however, that the Speaker of the House and the Presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate can and should remain in the line 
of succession as eligible successors, but at the end of the line, for 
this reason: September 11th raises the possibility of the worst-case 
scenario of the death or disability of the President, Vice President, 
and everybody we can imagine putting in the Cabinet, including a 
First Secretary or a panel of First Secretaries. 
Now, our discussion of Presidential succession this morning is oc-
curring in the context of a broader conversation about continuity 
in the Federal Government as a whole, including what steps can 
be taken to ensure that there always is a functioning Congress. If 
there is a functioning Congress, whether because Congress sur-
vived the terrorist attack intact or because Congress has somehow 
been reconstituted, under Article I the first and necessary step in 
each House will be to pick a Speaker and a President pro tem, re-
spectively. Those two offices always will be filled, and if they al-
ways are filled and if those officers remain in the line of succession, 
then we have someplace for the executive power to devolve in that 
worst-case scenario. And I would suggest, in fact, that keeping 
them in the line is necessary because in their absence in the worst- 
case scenario, there is no one under the Constitution or statute 
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who would be able to assume the Executive power short of holding 
a new election. 
Second, the other major change that needs to be made to section 
19, in addition to reordering the line of succession, is to provide for 
special expedited elections whenever section 19 has been triggered 
by a permanent double vacancy. Now, the original 1792 statute 
provided for expedited elections. That provision has not been in-
cluded in either of the two subsequent enactments. 
Now, I agree that what we could call indirect or what Professor 
Amar has called ‘‘apostolic democratic legitimacy’’ attaches to an 
Acting President who had been a member of the Cabinet, who had 
been the hand-picked policy surrogate of the populist President. 
But I would suggest that that indirect democratic legitimate legit-
imacy only lasts for a short period of time. It lasts long enough to 
restore order, to calm the public, and to begin the recovery process. 
It does not for 3 years and 4 months, which is how long an Acting 
President, whether it had been Speaker Hastert, Secretary Powell, 
Secretary O’Neill, would have held the executive power had the 
tragedy of September 11th included the deaths of the President 
and Vice President. 
This special election reasonably can occur within approximately 
6 months. That is enough time to allow for national mourning, to 
allow the restoration of some public stability, and to allow the 
States to organize 51 simultaneous popular elections. And the elec-
tion would bestow direct popular legitimacy on the occupant of the 
White House via deliberative selection by the national electoral 
constituency. Finally, and most importantly, that special election 
enables the Nation truly to move forward in the longer term behind 
a nationally popularly chosen President and Vice President. 
I thank the Committee for the opportunity to address this joint 
hearing, and I wish this body every success in drawing the most 
workable and most structurally consistent Presidential succession 
process. 
Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wasserman appears as a submis-
sion for the record.] 
Chairman LOTT. Thank you, Professor Wasserman. 
Before we begin our questions, Senator Feingold has returned. If 
you would like to make a statement at this time, we would be glad 
to hear from you. 
STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR 
FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 
Chairman Cornyn as well, for holding this important hearing. 
The topic of Presidential succession has occupied the Congress 
periodically since our Nation’s founding. Usually a revival in inter-
est in the topic occurs because of some event that leads us to dust 
off the statute and the Constitution and contemplate, ‘‘What if?’’ 
That happened when Andrew Johnson succeeded to the Presidency 
upon the assassination of Abraham Lincoln and then was im-
peached by the House of Representatives. 
It happened again when Harry Truman became President after 
the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He viewed the statutory 
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solution reached in 1886 as unsatisfactory and convinced Congress 
to pass a new succession statute. 
The assassination of President Kennedy led to the adoption of 
the 25th Amendment as the country contemplated how a Vice 
President who becomes President should be replaced and what 
should happen if the President become disabled. 
Now, as the witnesses have already indicated, of course, Sep-
tember 11th has revived interest in Presidential succession. The 
possibility of a terrorist attack that takes the life of both the Presi-
dent and the Vice President—[microphone out]—contemplate. But 
we have a duty to at least examine the question of whether the 
Constitution and the U.S. Code are adequate to preserve the Union 
and provide the country with the best possible leadership in such 
a crisis. 
The issues raised by this topic are certainly interesting for any-
one interested in our system of Government and our Constitution, 
and I have already enjoyed hearing from our witnesses about them. 
Should leaders of the legislative branch be in the line of succes-
sion? If so, how? And which leaders? Should the succession be dif-
ferent in the case of death as opposed to disability of the President, 
Vice President, and others in the line of succession? And if so, how 
should we provide for a person higher up the chain to move into 
the office when they are able to do so? 
These are all questions worth exploring. I do not believe, how-
ever, and I know the Chairmen do not believe that we should ob-
sess about them. Our most dedicated efforts should be devoted to 
preventing the next terrorist attack and making sure our first re-
sponders are prepared to deal with it if it happen. This is not to 
say that this hearing should not have been held, but only to cau-
tion that the time and resources of this Congress and this Govern-
ment are finite, and we must not be distracted from the task at 
hand by too much attention to what will most likely be only theo-
retical questions. But I do think this is extremely interesting for 
any of us that have spent time in our lives looking at Government, 
and I thank again Chairman Lott and Chairman Cornyn for the 
opportunity to speak, and I look forward to the further testimony 
of our witnesses. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Chairman LOTT. Thank you, Senator Feingold, for your interest 
in this issue and other related issues and your desire to see that 
we consider reforms in a variety of areas to try to make the Con-
gress and the Government more efficient, and we appreciate your 
leadership. 
Let me go back then and get into some questions. Since you have 
testified first, we will come back to you, Professor Amar. Why did 
Truman more or less insist that leaders of Congress be included in 
the line of succession? If you look back at the history of that, that 
had been debated. Madison, as you all referred to, did not think 
leaders of Congress should be included, and then I guess there was 
another action taken in 1886 and then finally in 1946 or 1947 
when the last legislation was passed. But the history seems to indi-
cate that Truman really was advocating that Members of Congress 
be included. Was this just a way of currying favor? Or was there 
some basis for it? Because it does not make sense to me. 
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Mr. AMAR. President Truman was a great man. He was not bur-
dened with an extensive legal education. He actually had gone to 
law school but—and he did not present himself as a constitutional 
expert. He came from this body, and that was his biography, and 
I think he had real skepticism about the idea of someone unelected 
assuming the position. He had a certain phrase about people in the 
State Department, actually, that appears in McCullough’s biog-
raphy: ‘‘the striped pants boys.’’ So he had a certain skepticism 
about people who had never run for anything in their life. 
His proposal actually was not quite the same one that Congress 
adopted in 1947. For example, he wanted there to be a special elec-
tion in the event of a successor Presidency that the bill that Con-
gress passed did not include that provision, and he signed it any-
way. So the stakes were lower, of course, if it is just a brief period. 
I think that the 25th Amendment addresses some—that model 
addresses some of President Truman’s concerns by creating a sort 
of special legitimacy through a special confirmation process. And if 
we created a new Cabinet position at the top whose only purpose 
was really to be next in line, it could even be someone who had 
been President in the past or a former office holder the country had 
a great degree of confidence in. Then if candidates announced their 
prospective nominees to the American people before the November 
election, there would be a kind of national endorsement of that 
next-in-line position, which I think would satisfy Truman himself. 
Truman himself, of course, no one quite directly voted for him as 
Vice President, but when they voted for President Roosevelt, they 
voted for him as well. And so, too, I think an idea might be, well, 
if you vote for the candidate, you are voting for his Vice President, 
and also the third-in- line person that he has designated, and that 
would create a little bit more electoral responsibility. 
A final point is he is, of course, thinking about all of this before 
there has been a President Ford, before there has been a Vice 
President Rockefeller under the 25th Amendment process, which is 
sort of a different one than the one he is imagining. 
Chairman LOTT. Frankly, I am surprised that at least a couple 
of you, maybe three of you, have advocated an Assistant Vice Presi-
dent. I know some people who have in the past questioned the 
value of the current Vice Presidency, although I think over the 
years that position has grown in responsibility and visibility, too. 
But I don’t know. An Assistant Vice President just seems like we 
are adding even more—I do not know—encumbrances in a way. I 
mean, why would you want to go off on a wing that way when you 
have got an order of succession that you could go with? So I would 
be interested if any of you want to defend that a little bit. 
And the second thing is, though—because we are beginning to 
run out of time, and I will yield to the others for questions—can 
we do what we need to do in this area just with a statute? Or do 
you think we need a constitutional amendment? 
Mr. AMAR. I think for congressional continuity, there may be con-
stitutional amendment needs, but for this I think a statute could 
be pretty cleanly adopted. You do not have to go for the First Sec-
retary idea. I think the biggest thing that all of us have suggested 
is to seriously rethink the legislative leaders at the top of the suc-
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cession list if that does not work in a variety of ways, constitutional 
and policy. 
The reason for the new office, there are about three or four 
thoughts: It enables you to have someone who is out of Wash-
ington, D.C., because he does not have a regular day job, which or-
dinarily you might think, well, why create another make-work job? 
But if you are concerned about these absolute worst-case, what-if 
scenarios, the fact that he or she is out of the line of fire is an af-
firmative advantage. 
Chairman LOTT. I wonder if it isn’t a simpler solution just to say 
that one of Cabinet Secretaries—frankly, maybe a lot of the Cabi-
net Secretaries—could be out of this city. I never have quite under-
stood why the Secretary of Agriculture shouldn’t be in St. Louis or 
Kansas City or whoever wants it. 
Mr. AMAR. You could. A second thought is that the person who 
might be even the best Secretary of State might not necessarily be 
the best person in this very unusual double-death, double-disability 
situation. Maybe you want to just pick—I am a baseball purist. I 
do not much like the DH. But you might want to, you know, pick 
someone—maybe they are not a great fielder, but they are good at 
one very discrete function. They are great hitters. So one function, 
someone who in an absolute crisis would be the person that the 
American people have the most sense of comfort with, maybe even, 
again, someone who has held the position in the past. 
Chairman LOTT. OK. Mr. Baker, I think I see you squirming like 
you would like to get into this discussion. Do you want to respond 
briefly to any of those questions I propounded? Then I will yield to 
Senator Cornyn. 
Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Senator. I would say that a statute could 
solve most of these problems, but not all of them. And the one ex-
ample I gave in my testimony was this uncertainty under the 15th 
Amendment. We have an Acting President, let’s say a Cabinet offi-
cer or a Speaker who is serving as Acting President. One of their 
first duties under the 25th Amendment is to nominate a Vice Presi-
dent. 
Now, under the 25th Amendment, a Vice President becomes 
President if there is no President. And when we have an Acting 
President, we do not have a President. We have an Acting Presi-
dent. That is a distinction with a difference. There are different 
views on this, but I think it is a close call. And certainly it is rife 
with uncertainty. So I think there are some issues that need to be 
addressed by an amendment. 
In terms of having First Assistant Vice Presidents outside of 
Washington, one way to deal with this might be without estab-
lishing a formal office—but it would probably take an amendment 
to do this—is to allow the President to nominate, have the Senate 
confirm former prominent office holders that we would all have 
confidence in their ability to perform this function. Former Presi-
dent Bush, for example, could serve in the line of succession. One 
might imagine a Democratic President nominating former Vice 
President Gore or former Vice President Mondale. They would not 
have to receive any pay per se. They would not have to have an 
office. But in order to do that constitutionally, I think that it would 
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be probably necessary, if you are not going to create an office, to 
have a constitutional amendment to validate that process. 
But there are ways of doing it, of creating successors outside of 
the Cabinet who are not going to hold an office per se. Of course, 
holding an office per se is, I think, actually a good idea, but you 
don’t necessarily have to do that. 
In sum, most of the problems can be addressed by amendments 
to the statute, but I think there are a few issues that have to be 
addressed by a constitutional amendment. 
Chairman LOTT. Senator Cornyn? 
Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much, Chairman Lott. 
Gentlemen, we hear whenever constitutional amendments are 
proposed or even discussed in the Constitution Subcommittee, for 
example, or on the Judiciary Committee, about the reluctance that 
most people feel when it comes to amending the Constitution, al-
though we have done it 27 times. And hopefully when it is nec-
essary to do so, we will not show any hesitancy at discharging the 
duty that we have assumed as a Member of Congress when it 
comes to recommending those amendments that are necessary. 
But besides the constitutional issues that have been raised about 
Members of Congress serving in the line of succession, I wonder if 
you might have some comments, and I will start with Dr. Fortier— 
am I pronouncing that correctly?—first. 
But, for example, I am aware of the problems that occurred dur-
ing the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson when the 
President pro tem, anticipating his Senate colleagues would vote to 
remove Johnson and install him in the White House, actually an-
nounced Cabinet appointments that he would make were he made 
President, thus, in essence, building a constituency, I guess, for 
that choice. 
I am also aware of problems that occurred during the Vice Presi-
dential confirmation proceedings of Gerald Ford when some tried 
to delay confirmation so that House Speaker Carl Albert would be-
come President in the event Congress forced President Nixon to re-
sign from office. 
So do you see, in addition to constitutional issues, prudential 
concerns that would call for a constitutional amendment? Or do 
you think a statute would solve this? Please address that. 
Mr. FORTIER. I think most of the problems can be dealt with by 
statute. I agree with Professor Amar on the continuity of Congress 
issue, which we were pleased that you held a hearing on last week, 
that involves more of a constitutional solution. Most can be dealt 
with by statute. 
If we were redrafting the 25th Amendment, if we were at the 
stage where we had not put that in place, we might do it dif-
ferently. The initial draft of the 25th Amendment which came be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Committee, while President Johnson was 
President, without a Vice President, took Congress out of the line 
of succession and made it clear that the Cabinet would step in for 
an incapacitated President in the same way that the Vice President 
is empowered to do so in the current Act. That was ultimately 
taken out because of some concerns of offending the Speaker at the 
time, John McCormack, and once it was enacted and ratified, it 
was done without that. 
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So at that stage in time, I think we could clarify that and would 
go with the original version. But there are enough things that we 
can do in law to even specify in a little bit more detail what the 
procedure would be for a Cabinet member taking over in an inca-
pacitation situation. 
You also mentioned the case of impeachment. I think it is worth-
while looking at each scenario that Congress is in the line of suc-
cession, and the impeachment and removal scenario is one where 
Congress has a real conflict of interest because it not only has to 
choose to remove the President, but it would put one of its own in 
place, and theoretically a party switch. You mentioned the two 
cases where we came very close to that. 
Senator CORNYN. One other question I had was about other re-
forms over and above those that you have discussed in your pre-
pared statements, each one of you here. I wonder if, as long as we 
are looking at trying to address these issues, whether we should 
look at these as well. 
For example, I understand that the 25th Amendment addresses 
uncertainties in Presidential disability by allowing the Vice Presi-
dent and other officers to certify that the President is disabled. But 
the 25th Amendment does not address uncertainties in Vice Presi-
dential disability. What happens if both the President and the Vice 
President are disabled? Do we need a statute to provide some objec-
tive standard, if that is possible, for determining a Vice Presi-
dential disability? Or can we assume that if both the Vice Presi-
dent and the President are not well enough to assert their claims 
to the Presidency, the office will just automatically devolve on 
someone else according to the statute? 
I wonder if we could perhaps—Professor Wasserman, do you 
have any thoughts in that regard? 
Mr. WASSERMAN. My initial thought is that we at some level 
need some objective standards as to both the President controlled 
by—the 25th Amendment does not establish the standards for 
President—for determining the Presidential—when the President is 
disabled. But as to both, if both offices—or if there is a disability 
in both offices, then by the terms of section 19, it would just de-
volve. It would just devolved down. Again, the reason for the im-
port of moving Cabinet officers up to the top to keep all that move-
ment, because the disability could be temporary, to keep any move-
ment within the executive branch and not bringing Members of 
Congress into the mix. 
Senator CORNYN. Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of other areas of in-
terest, as I know all of us do, and I know we will be able to submit 
any questions we have in writing as well as follow up. But at this 
time I would yield. 
Thank you very much. 
Chairman LOTT. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 
I believe—is it ‘‘For-teer’’ or ‘‘For-ti-ay’’? 
Mr. FORTIER. Well, you have raised a family dispute, but I say 
‘‘For-ti-ay.’’ 
[Laughter.] 
Chairman LOTT. If it is in Louisiana and the Mississippi Gulf 
Coast, it is ‘‘For-ti-ay.’’ If it is here, I thought it was ‘‘For-teer.’’ 
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Mr. FORTIER. Well, for some reason, my Northeast family has 
picked up your Mississippi tradition of ‘‘For-ti-ay.’’ 
Chairman LOTT. All right. Well— 
Mr. AMAR. It is ‘‘For-ti-air’’ in Connecticut. 
[Laughter.] 
Chairman LOTT. You say you think it is unconstitutional to have 
congressional leaders in the line of succession, I believe, in your 
testimony. Why? I believe that point was made by Senator Cornyn, 
but I want to get a clarification on that. And then, Senator Fein-
gold, if you want to pick up with some questions after that? 
Mr. FORTIER. I think there is a not universal but dominant posi-
tion among constitutional scholars that it is for two reasons. 
One, the word ‘‘officer’’ that appears in Article II, Members of 
Congress are not officers of the United States, and if you look at 
the Framers, they intended there to be officers of the United States 
in the line. 
Second, the larger structural argument about separation of pow-
ers, that the Framers probably did not intend that. 
My recommendation actually is to think through the policy con-
sequences of each of the scenarios rather than simply rely on that. 
And I have one exception to that, and that, I mentioned earlier, is 
the case where a President fails to qualify. You have, as I say, an 
election controversy which is not resolved before January 20th. In 
1876, we went up to just a couple of days before the March inau-
guration without a President. Or you have some sort of cata-
strophic attack where both the President and Vice President are 
killed just before the inauguration. 
That scenario is guided by the 20th Amendment, and that lan-
guage is different. It does not require an officer. It just refers to 
Congress being able to put the person that they choose in the line. 
So that narrow case, I think, is not unconstitutional, but I would 
recommend you look at the policy consequences of each of the var-
ious scenarios that Congress would come into the line. 
Chairman LOTT. Senator Dodd has joined us. Senator Dodd, if 
you would like to make a statement at this time and then pick up 
on the questioning, we would be glad to hear from you. 
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, A U.S. SENATOR 
FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 
Senator DODD. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairmen, both 
of our Chairs, and I apologize for arriving a few minutes late here 
this morning, but let me thank our witnesses as well for their 
statements and their views on this important subject. And I thank 
both of our Chairs here and commend you both for calling this joint 
hearing. This is not a common experience, but I think it is a worth-
while one, when we are addressing an issue of this significance and 
importance. And, certainly, the events of 9/11 were a not so subtle 
reminder of the potential scenarios that could call into question, ob-
viously, the procedures for establishing Presidential succession. 
And so I think this is a very timely and important subject matter. 
This is exactly the environment under which we ought to be consid-
ering those questions before a national catastrophe occurs and we 
are forced to act in haste or in response to a constitutional crisis. 
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As I know you have all heard, and those who have followed this 
subject matter know, Article II, section 1, obviously, of the Con-
stitution and subsequent amendments establishes the foundation 
for Presidential succession, makes clear that the Framers’ pref-
erence that the Vice President should succeed to a vacancy in the 
Presidency. In their wisdom, the Framers left to Congress the ques-
tion of how to settle a double vacancy, as occurs if the Presidency 
and the Vice Presidency are both left vacant. The Congress did not 
hesitate to fill this void and passed the first Presidential Succes-
sion Act in 1792, as you all know. 
It is noteworthy that in the 211-year history since that Act was 
adopted, Congress has only twice substantively or substantially re-
vised it, which is rather unique considering how Congress usually 
likes to act in these matters, in both cases in response to cir-
cumstances related to the death of a sitting President. The history 
of the Succession Act and its progeny is a reflection, I think, of the 
200-plus-year debate on the subject and the dilemma Congress 
faces when it considers a change only in response to a crisis. This 
history is also revealing in its consideration of the same issues that 
our witnesses have 
raised here today. And if we are to avoid the mistakes of the 
past, then we only need to look at our own history. 
The 1792 Act provided that in the case of a double vacancy, the 
order of succession would fall to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and then the Speaker of the House. But the term of either 
of those legislative officers was to be temporary only since the Act 
provided for a special election to fill the Presidential vacancy, un-
less the vacancy occurred in the last full year of the term. 
The placement of the legislative officers in the line of succession 
was not universally supported, as historians will note, and its crit-
ics included such constitutional authorities as James Madison. Rep-
resentative Jonathan Sturgis of Connecticut observed at the time 
that if the Speaker were in the line of succession, there would be— 
and I am quoting him—‘‘cabling and electioneering’’ in the choice 
of Speaker. However, the Act remained substantially unchanged for 
nearly a hundred years. 
The Succession Act of 1886 followed the assassination of Presi-
dent James Garfield in 1881 and his incapacitation for a period of 
almost 80 days, and the untimely death of Vice President Thomas 
Andrews Hendricks in 1885, less than 9 months after his inaugura-
tion. Ironically, in both circumstances, both the office of the Presi-
dent pro tempore, then third in line to the Presidency, and the of-
fice of the Speaker, then fourth in line, were vacant at the time. 
Similarly, in both cases, there was a potential that least the posi-
tion of the President pro tempore of the Senate would be filled by 
a member of the opposing party, thereby potentially leading to a 
switch in party should a double vacancy arise. 
To ensure the line of succession reduced the risk that such suc-
cession would result in a change in party in the White House, Con-
gress passed the Succession Act of 1886, which eliminated the 
President pro tempore and the Speaker from the line of succession 
and provided for succession through Cabinet officers. The 1886 Act 
also eliminated the requirement for a special election that had gov-
erned succession for more than 60 years. 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 14:03 Dec 23, 2008 Jkt 045948 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\45948.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
23 
It was yet another death of a sitting President, that of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt in April 1945, less than 3 months into his fourth 
term, and the ascendancy of the Presidency of Harry Truman that 
precipitated the latest revisions in Presidential succession, the Suc-
cession Act of 1947. President Truman found himself ill-prepared 
for the vacancy he filled, noting in his memoirs that, ‘‘Under the 
present system, a Vice President cannot equip himself to become 
President merely by virtue of being second in rank. The voters 
should select him as a spare Chief Executive.’’ 
With the ensuing vacancy in the Vice Presidency, Truman was 
called upon to nominate his successor, a task he did not relish. In 
his special message to Congress on June 19, 1945, President Tru-
man declared that he did not believe that in a democracy this 
power should rest with the Chief Executive. He recommended that 
Congress restore an elected officer to the line of succession, in this 
case the Speaker, whom Truman argued had a more recent man-
date, having been elected every 2 years, as opposed to 6 in the case 
of the President pro tempore of the Senate. Truman also rec-
ommended that the requirement for a special election be restored. 
In response, Congress enacted the Succession Act, which provides 
for the Presidential succession in the case of a double vacancy, but 
does not require that a special election be held. 
Many issues that faced the 2nd Congress in 1792 and the 49th 
Congress in 1886 and the 80th Congress in 1947 are before us 
again here today. But today, while it is both fortunate and oppor-
tune that Congress is not faced with an immediate crisis, we are 
faced with one of even greater magnitude than the one imagined 
by previous Congresses: the potential elimination of the entire line 
of succession by one terrorist act. 
It is prudent that we act now to remove any constitutional ques-
tions or deficiencies in the Presidential succession procedures. The 
principles that must guide our deliberations, in my view, are the 
need to establish certainty, clarity, and the constitutionality of suc-
cession. The legitimacy of our democracy hangs obviously in the 
balance of what we do, and nowhere is the need for a nonpartisan/ 
bipartisan approach more imperative than here. 
So, again, I look forward to the testimony that you have already 
given, and thank you again for being here. 
Let me ask all of you to sort of comment on the Truman com-
mentary that he made in his speech to Congress in 1945. Did 
Harry Truman have it right in your views? Or did the Congress 
have it right based on the actions that the Congress took subse-
quent to his recommendations? Begin where you would like to 
begin. Who would like to start? 
Mr. AMAR. Well, Chairman Lott asked about President Truman, 
and I did endorse, in response to Chairman Lott’s question, the 
idea, which some other witnesses have, a special election might be 
a very good idea, and Truman proposed it, and Congress did not 
adopt that. And Truman might have been right on that. 
Let me mention one other decision that Congress made, a subse-
quent Congress. The Congress that proposed the 25th Amendment 
after the assassination of President Kennedy, in effect, repudiated 
the basic premise under which Truman operated. It basically said 
that a President, in effect, should pick his successor as long as that 
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successor is validated by a special kind of democratic confirmation 
process. That is what the 25th Amendment does. It provides for an 
unelected President, someone who was not even on the Presidential 
ticket. It provides for President Gerald Ford. It provides for Vice 
President, could be President, Nelson Rockefeller. So that is a de-
termination that Congress made after 1945, after 1947, that I 
think really undercuts in some ways Truman’s vision. And if we 
wanted to rethink it now, we need to think about the 25th Amer-
ica, and as John has mentioned, the 20th Amendment as well, in 
terms of coming up with a statute that fits our modern constitu-
tional sensibilities. 
Let me mention one other amendment, which is the lame-duck 
amendment, the 22nd Amendment, which enables Congress to 
meet before the Presidential inauguration and creates the possi-
bility of the outgoing President, in effect, nominating the incoming 
President’s Cabinet and having all of that confirmed before Inau-
guration Day as a matter of transition courtesy, which would solve 
another special window of vulnerability that John has mentioned 
that I have previously testified on in 1994. 
Senator DODD. John? 
Mr. FORTIER. I, too, share some concerns with the larger tack 
that President Truman took about putting Congress in the line of 
succession. His concern was that we should have an elected person 
in the line. My concerns are partly constitutional, but mostly I 
think that in many cases it is bad policy to have congressional 
leaders in the line. 
Senator DODD. The Speaker does not have to be elected either. 
Mr. FORTIER. The Speaker does not have to be elected. That is 
true, although we have never had that scenario. But there are dif-
ficult separation-of-powers questions which force the Speaker or 
the pro tem or whoever takes office to more or less resign their of-
fice, even in a temporary situation. That is just one example of why 
having Congress in the line does not lead to the sort of stability 
that we would hope for in a case—it could be a case of a horrific 
attack where there are numbers of Members, people in the line of 
succession, dead or incapacitated, and forcing multiple Presidents 
or the Speaker to take over for a short period of time, only to then 
be displaced, and potentially another Speaker then later to take 
the Presidency would lead to the sort of confusion that we do not 
want to see after an attack. 
Chairman LOTT. Senator Dodd, could I ask a question there? 
Senator DODD. Sure. 
Chairman LOTT. I wondered why they switched from the Presi-
dent pro tem being third to fourth. Was it just purely simply the 
argument that President Truman made that he wanted the one 
most recently who had faced election? Was that the only justifica-
tion for it? Was there more to it than that? 
Mr. FORTIER. The original Act had the pro tem, as you men-
tioned, and that was in the 2nd Congress. And the relative impor-
tance of the two offices, I think, was not as established. In fact, the 
tradition that we now have of electing the longest-serving member 
of the majority party the pro tem was not in place then. Truman 
made the point that the Speaker of the House was mostly truly 
representative of the American people in that he had been or she 
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had been elected to a district and then elected by a majority of the 
body. 
Chairman LOTT. And the President pro tem position evolved into 
what it now is, which is that he is or she is the longest-serving 
Member of the Senate of the majority party. Earlier it had been 
based on something other than just longevity, right? 
Mr. AMAR. And the speaker ship also suggests an inattention, 
putting that first in line, to some of the practical considerations 
that my friend John has really highlighted. If we look at American 
history, we are struck by the fact that for much of it, there is no 
Speaker of the House because the House is not a continuing body 
the way this body is. And so in 1857 and then again in 1859, there 
is not a Speaker for 11 months out of the 24-month cycle. So that 
is really not what you want if you focus again on some of these 
practical considerations about continuity. 
So if you look at the founding vision of the executive branch, its 
energy, its unity, its vigor, its dispatch, but one of the central ideas 
is one person always there, 24/7/365, and that is why you have this 
constitutionally designated understudy of the Vice President, who 
immediately takes over. That is why you have a provision that if 
both of them are out of action, there needs to be someone at every 
instant. 
In England, there is an idea of complete continuity: ‘‘The King 
is dead. Long live the King.’’ At every instant, our system actually 
has to have a President, and we should be certain who that person 
is, and the Commander in Chief line of military chain of command 
needs to know exactly who the President is at every instant. And 
the Speaker of the House is actually quite unfortunately designed 
with that practical consideration in mind. 
Mr. WASSERMAN. There was also a partisan concern that Presi-
dent Truman expressed to Congress that he wanted party con-
tinuity, if at all possible, and having settled on legislative succes-
sion, he acted on the belief that the House was more likely to be 
in party agreement, therefore the Speaker more likely to be in 
party agreement, than was the Senate. That has not been— 
Chairman LOTT. If you see this chart over here, that has not 
been the case. 
Mr. WASSERMAN. That has not proven to— 
Chairman LOTT. The last 50 years. 
Mr. WASSERMAN. But that is a product of the post—that type of 
divided Government I think is more of a product of the post-World 
War II society. I think prior to 1945, there was some validity or 
certainly more validity than there has been since the statute has 
been in place. 
Senator DODD. Dr. Fortier, you raised the issue of certain Cabi-
net officers, junior status, may be ill-equipped to perform the func-
tions of the Presidency. Isn’t it, though, in a sense—I mean, given 
the fact that you would expect the sort of rallying around, on the 
assumption most Presidents have some fairly competent people 
around a Cabinet table, the fact that the line of succession may fall 
to someone who would be of more junior status, maybe less experi-
enced—just think of this Cabinet, for instance. You look at Donald 
Rumsfeld or Colin Powell. You move on down the line. You could 
choose someone who may not have the same experience. And yet 
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having those individuals around would certainly minimize, 
wouldn’t it—it is a question—the lack of experience that a more 
junior member of that Cabinet might have if, in fact, it fell to that 
individual? 
Mr. FORTIER. My proposal is that the top five or top four—and 
we are talking about putting the Homeland Security Secretary in 
there as five Cabinet members—are always going to be very sub-
stantial figures that have some connection to national security, if 
we are talking about a catastrophic attack, which by definition we 
are if we are going down the line to people with those sort of quali-
fications. 
My additional proposal is that we have some offices created 
around the country with some substantial figures in them—the eli-
gible sitting Governors or former Presidents, former Vice Presi-
dents, Cabinet members, Members of Congress—who are—if we 
can create a way for them to be tapped into the current adminis-
tration as advisers and coordinators for their regions of homeland 
security, those people, I argue, may be more qualified or more—we 
would feel more comfortable with them assuming the Presidency in 
an extreme circumstance than a Cabinet member of other depart-
ments who were probably picked for more specific policy reasons— 
knowledge of the field of education, knowledge of the field of agri-
culture. 
We could, by having these additional offices, make it a point that 
the main reason for having these people is to assume the Presi-
dency in the worst case, and we are being explicit that that is why 
they are chosen rather than as a secondary reason. 
Senator DODD. Mr. Baker suggests, obviously, using Governors 
as part of this, but I gather the rest of you would have some hesi-
tancy about having a Governor be very high up in a line of succes-
sion. But yet you just suggest somehow that having Governors of 
part of some elongated list would make some sense. Is that correct? 
Mr. FORTIER. I think that we are not too far off, Mr. Baker and 
I. I think— 
Senator DODD. Make a case for me in light of the California case 
here pending now. 
[Laughter.] 
Senator DODD. Here is that large State and a California Gov-
ernor I presume would be—that would be sort of a natural choice. 
In light of what is going on in California, would you really want 
this to— 
Mr. BAKER. Senator, it depends upon the Governor. And that is 
why the President should have the discretion. I do not think the 
Congress should designate by State and say we will start off with 
California, New York, and Texas in that order. I think these kinds 
of questions are best left to the President’s discretion and his judg-
ment who is among the pool of Governors of his party who is best 
suited to serve him. So if the President were allowed to nominate 
a sitting Governor and have that person confirmed by the Senate 
to be in this contingent role, I think that would provide a successor 
outside of Washington. 
Senator DODD. It would add a whole new dimension to the nomi-
nation process here, wouldn’t it? 
Mr. BAKER. It is always fun, Senator. 
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Chairman LOTT. Senator DeWine, thank you for being here for 
the entire hearing, and we would be glad to hear your questions. 
Senator DEWINE. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me just 
thank our panelists. I think you have some absolutely excellent 
suggestions. There is only one suggestion, I think, that is a little 
troubling to me, and that is the idea of the special election. Harry 
Truman is one of my favorite Presidents, but I think it is just a 
bad idea, and let me tell you why. 
I think the last thing in a time of crisis that we need is uncer-
tainty, and what we do is certainty. And the idea on September 
11th that, if something had happened to President Bush, that we 
would have faced with a new President the specter of a special 
election in, say, 6 months is to me frightening. What we would 
have needed at that time is certainty that that man or woman who 
was the new President would have been able to serve the full term. 
That person would have been the President of the United States, 
and everybody in the world would have known it. And the idea that 
we would have faced a special election in 6 months I think to me 
is chilling. And so I think it is a horrible idea. Just the day and 
age we live in today I think it is just not a good idea. I do not think 
it was a good idea in 1945. I think Harry Truman did real well 
from 1945 to 1948, and I think history shows that. So just my com-
ment. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Chairman LOTT. Senator Cornyn? 
Senator CORNYN. Senator DeWine, I share your concerns about 
an election. As a matter of fact, last week, talking about the con-
tinuity of Congress, we have some competing proposals—one as a 
statutory fix, the other would be a constitutional amendment. And 
I guess perhaps again for the reason I stated earlier, because of the 
oft-stated concern about constitutional amendments and the dif-
ficulty in Article V in actually getting a constitutional amendment 
passed and ratified, the statutory fixes were proposed, including ex-
pedited elections. 
But one of the concerns that I would have about a quick election 
is, number one, the disenfranchisement of military voters, for ex-
ample, that is a concern, not to mention in the wake of a 9/11 or 
worse the kind of chaos that would reign while we were trying to 
conduct an election process. 
So while obviously elections are important, ultimately there 
would be an election, but at least in the interim, I think stability 
and the need to provide some calm and clarity lest we get into 
more litigation or uncertainty is, I think, an initial process whereby 
it would devolve to another officer, as we have discussed earlier, it 
is far preferable to even an expedited election under those cir-
cumstances. But I would be glad to—Professor Amar, do you have 
any thoughts in that regard? 
Mr. AMAR. In an earlier, pre-9/11 article, I did suggest that if the 
statute were revised, I added just in the paragraph that we should 
really think about providing for a special election 8 months later. 
I was not thinking about 9/11 in 1996, and my main suggestion 
was to cure the unconstitutionality by pulling the legislative lead-
ers out of the line of succession, and not just the unconstitution-
ality but the impracticality in a variety of policy settings where 
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this might occur. The statute just does not quite work as a prac-
tical matter. 
There is a tradeoff. To the extent that you get someone who is 
very highly validated by the American people as, say, the Vice 
President himself has never been, even in 1972, a provision for spe-
cial election when Presidential power merely was transferred from 
President to Vice President, from Franklin Roosevelt to Harry Tru-
man, partly under the idea perhaps that the American people al-
ready did vote for this person as their spare, as their next in line. 
Now, if you were to create a new office and President as a matter 
of custom or to name that person—to tell the American people be-
fore the election whom they were going to name, whether it was 
whom they were going to name as their Secretary of State, who is 
first in line, or whom they are going to name as their First Sec-
retary, then, again, the election itself might have validated that 
person to serve out the President’s term, which, of course, is the 
25th Amendment model, too. You vote for Nixon, and he had a 4- 
year term, and if he cannot serve it out, it will be Agnew, whom 
you voted for; and if not Agnew, Ford, whom he has designated and 
who has been confirmed by a special process; and if not Ford, then 
Rockefeller. And so, actually, that 25th Amendment model, which 
I suggested as a possible template in the event that these things 
become—the disability occurs simultaneously rather than sequen-
tially, that is not a special election model. 
The special election model might be more suitable if you are 
going to very far down the succession list. Then it is a little harder 
for the American—and if it is 3 years and 8 months or 3 years and 
9 months, very early in a Presidential term, very low down on the 
succession list, then there is the anxiety. And I do not think we 
would want to have it 2 months later, 3 months later, maybe 8 
months or 9 months. And then the question is: Is it worth the can-
dle—if the disability, double disability occurred very early in a 
Presidential term, say a month in or at inauguration, it might be 
very different than if it occurs 3 years in or even 2 years in. 
One final thought, since you talked about the military and people 
voting and voting in a crisis. Here is an amazing fact about our his-
tory, let’s say, compared to the mother country, England. They do 
not have fixed and regular elections in their tradition. Parliament 
promised, try septennial elections—I mean triennial elections in 
the 1700s and then changed it. But during World War II, there was 
no election held in England between 1935 and 1945. Churchill 
gives up on Halloween 1944 and tells the House of Commons, ‘‘No 
one under 30’’—the generation that is actually making the supreme 
sacrifice. ‘‘No one under 30 has ever voted in a general election or 
a bye election; whereas, we held regular elections on time, even 
during the Great Depression and World War II, because President 
Lincoln held an election, one that he actually thought he was going 
to lose for a long time, but he held it fair and square on time with 
votes coming, the decisive votes, from the field, actually. 
So we have been able to run elections, although not special ones, 
even during moments of our greatest crises—the Civil War, the 
Great Depression, World War II—and, actually other countries 
have not always done it, even great democracies like Great Britain. 
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Senator CORNYN. Professor Amar, one last follow-up. You noted 
in your opening comments that you testified before the Sub-
committee on the Constitution in 1994 on this very subject. Is that 
correct? 
Mr. AMAR. On a very closely related subject. 
Senator CORNYN. I do not recall what the context was. 
Mr. AMAR. That was about special windows of vulnerability right 
around election time and inauguration time. If one of the can-
didates is knocked out the week before the Presidential election, we 
are in serious trouble. If the person who actually won the seeming 
vote is knocked out prior to the meeting of the Electoral College, 
there are some real areas of difficulty. It is all cited in the notes 
to my testimony. I have asked, actually, that that be added to the 
record. That was Senator Simon chairing that Subcommittee back 
on Groundhog Day 1994. 
Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Chairman LOTT. Thank you again, Senator Cornyn, for your 
leadership, Senator Dodd, for coming, Senator DeWine, and the 
panel, thank you very much. We may have another hearing on this 
subject later on, but I hope we can find a way to actually act and 
get some results. 
In the meantime, I will be talking to Speaker Hastert and Presi-
dent pro tem Ted Stevens about how we get this accomplished. 
[Laughter.] 
Chairman LOTT. The hearing is adjourned. 
[Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
[Submissions for the record follow.] 
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